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Law, culture and sustainability: corporate governance in the Nordic countries 
JUKKA MÄHÖNEN AND GUĐRÚN JOHNSEN* 
1. Introduction 
The Nordic area today, which has its origins in the two medieval empires of Denmark and Sweden, 
covers five independent countries, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway and Sweden, plus the 
autonomous or semi-autonomous Faroe Islands, Greenland and the Åland Islands. The Sámi, the only 
indigenous people in Europe, are scattered across northern Finland, Norway, Sweden and Russia. Their 
cultural rights are restricted and their political rights to an autonomous economy are nearly non-
existent.1 The legal cultures and legal systems of the Nordic countries can, as a result of their shared 
historical background, be divided into the Atlantic ‘West Scandinavian’ (Denmark, Faroe Islands, 
Greenland, Iceland and Norway) and the Baltic ‘East Scandinavian’ (Finland, Sweden and Åland), Danish 
being the respective historical languages of the law of West Scandinavia and Swedish of East.2 
The Nordic countries started to build a welfare state, after World War II, using a framework coined the 
Scandinavian model, emphasising aspects such as labour-employer cooperation.3 The model reached 
peak prominence in the 1970s, its heavy emphasis on the business-to-consumer-relationship being 
based on new legislation in contracting, compensation of damages, and consumer protection. 
Competition law as a tool for consumer welfare gained dominance after three members of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), Denmark, Finland and Sweden, joined the European Union (EU). 
Iceland and Norway remained members of EFTA and are connected to the other Scandinavian EU 
member countries through participation in the European Economic Area (EEA).4 
Nordic corporate governance models have been comprehensively studied in the international 
literature, emphasising the high level of trust in Nordic societies. It also emphasises Nordic aspects 
 
* This chapter draws on research in the ongoing project Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART, 
2016-2020), which receives funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under Grant Agreement No 693642. We thank Beate Sjåfjell for her extensive help. 
1 See Ø. Ravna, ‘Sámi Legal Culture – and its Place in Norwegian Law’ in J.Ø. Sunde and K.E. Skodvin (eds.) 
Rendezvous of European Legal Cultures (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2010), p. 149. Other indigenous people 
jurisdictions are described in G. Christensen, ‘What does it mean to be sustainable? Regulating the relationship 
between corporations and indigenous peoples’, Ch. 30 in this volume. 
2 See also U. Bernitz, ’What is Scandinavian Law?’ (2007) 50 Scandinavian Studies in Law, 50; R. Strand, R.E. 
Freeman and K. Hockerts, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability in Scandinavia: An Overview’ (2015) 
127 Journal of Business Ethics, 1; N. Götz, ‘Structures That Do Not Make a Region’ (2003) 10 European Review of 
History—Revue européenne d’Histoire, 323. There is no clear definition of ‘Nordic’ or ‘Scandinavian’ and these 
adjectives are used interchangeably in this chapter, especially in legal and social contexts, see Götz, ‘Structures’. 
3 See Götz, ‘Structures’, 332. 
4 See M.J. Iversen and L. Thue, ‘Creating Nordic capitalism – the business history of a competitive periphery’, in 
S. Fellman, M.J. Iversen, H. Sjögren and L. Thue (eds.), Creating Nordic Capitalism: The Development of a 
Competitive Periphery (Basingstone: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 1; Bernitz, ‘What is Scandinavian Law?' 
2 
 
such as social liberalism, majority shareholder power, a concentrated state and the counterbalancing 
of family and foundation shareholdings by strong minority shareholder protection. This 
counterbalancing is based on a principle of equal treatment of shareholders, which also restricts the 
tunnelling of private benefits. A ‘weak’ two-tier governance model and nearly 100 per cent non-
executive boards are also mentioned in the literature. There are also, in Nordic countries, an array of 
cooperatives of different sizes and small and medium sized family owned enterprises.5 
The Nordic governance model has also been described as being ‘outside-in’, putting the non-
shareholder ‘stakeholder’6 interests first. This is in contrast to the business model of ‘inside-out’, 
associated with neoclassical economics, in which corporations put shareholder interests first through 
maximising sales and distributable profits. Nordic corporations and their controlling shareholders 
allegedly first consider how the corporation can best meet stakeholders needs, based on the values 
shared by the corporation and its stakeholders (including the employees and the state).7 Another label 
attached to the post-war Nordic model, at least until the 1990s, is ‘implicit’ corporate social 
responsibility (CSR).8 This is based on ‘a consensual political culture, a strong social-democratic welfare 
state, and well-functioning partnerships between business, government and labour organizations’. The 
changes that have taken place since the 1990s have not primarily been to content but to how CSR is 
expressed explicitly as an organizational target.9 
 
5 See for example R.J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the 
Comparative Taxonomy’ (2006) 116 Harvard Law Review, 1641; P. Lekvall (ed.), The Nordic Corporate Governance 
Model (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 2014); S.-E. Sjöstrand, T. Berglund, L. Grönberg, M. Kallifatides, F. Poulfelt, S. Pöyry 
and O. Sigurjonsson, Nordic Corporate Governance: An Extensive In-Depth Study of Corporate Governance and 
Board Practices in 36 Large Companies (Stockholm: Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research, 2016); 
K.R. Ilmonen, ‘A Political Narrative of Nordic Corporate Governance: Shareholders, Stakeholders and Change of 
Control’ (2015) 12 European Company and Financial Law Review, 489; S. Thomsen, ‘The Nordic Corporate 
Governance Model’ (2016) 12 Management and Organization Review, 189. 
6 The standard definition of ‘stakeholder’ comes from R.E. Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder 
Approach (Boston: Pitman, 1984) p. 46: ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the firm’s objectives.’ However, the ‘stakeholder’ concept is older in Scandinavia, deriving from E. Rhenman, 
Företagsdemokrati och företagsorganisation [Industrial democracy and industrial management] (Stockholm: 
Thule, 1964) (‘intressent’); see J. Näsi, ‘A Scandinavian approach to stakeholder thinking: An analysis of its 
theoretical and practical uses, 1964–1980’ in J. Näsi (ed.), Understanding Stakeholder Thinking (Helsinki: LSR-
Julkaisut Oy, 1995), pp. 97, 98; R. Strand and R.E. Freeman, ‘Scandinavian Cooperative Advantage: The Theory 
and Practice of Stakeholder Engagement in Scandinavia’ (2015) 27 Journal of Business Ethics, 65, 68. We 
recognise the concept, but we at the same time see it as being a highly problematic concept in a corporate law 
context, as it is not based on law. 
7 Strand, Freeman and Hockerts, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability in Scandinavia’, 8. 
8 S.G. Carson, Ø. Hagen and S.P. Sethi, ‘From Implicit to Explicit CSR in a Scandinavian Context: The Cases of HÅG 
and Hydro’ (2015) 127 Journal of Business Ethics, 17, 19. 
9 Carson, Hagen and Sethi, ‘From Implicit to Explicit’, 21. 
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One important reason for Nordic firms’ outside-in perspective, which is often combined with a 
‘stakeholder’ approach,10 is that the Nordic corporate culture has been dominated by public market 
actors at the government level. The breakthrough of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) took place in the 
Nordic countries, as in many other places in Europe, after World War II. The Norwegian State has, after 
the discovery of oil in 1967, been an active global investor on stock exchanges, through the Norwegian 
sovereign wealth fund (SWF), the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global. The banking sector is 
heavily regulated and centralised, especially in Finland, Iceland and Norway, due to the banking crises 
in Norway in 1988, Finland in 1991 and in particular in Iceland in 2008. 
In this chapter, we discuss what elements within Nordic corporate law, governance and culture 
contribute to corporate sustainability11 in the Nordic area. In section 2 we provide a general overview 
of Nordic corporate law and corporate governance; section 3 focuses on two important Nordic 
corporate cultural phenomena, the role of private investors and the banks in corporate sustainability; 
section 4 discusses the role of the Nordic states as active market actors and their contribution to 
corporate sustainability, particularly SOEs and SWFs, and Section 5 concludes the chapter. 
This chapter concentrates on companies and listed companies in particular. This is not to diminish the 
role of other business forms such as foundations, associations, partnerships and particularly 
cooperatives, all of which are important in the Nordic context. Only the role of these business forms 
as institutional investors in non-financial companies are discussed in this chapter. The role of 
foundations and other non-company investor forms is a unique Nordic phenomenon. 
2. Nordic corporate law and corporate governance 
Nordic company law, as for most Western company laws, was derived in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century. Denmark, Finland and Norway had a Swedish type of companies act by the early 
twentieth century, with full harmonization nearly being achieved through a harmonization project in 
the 1960s. Denmark, an EFTA founding member and through its membership of the European 
Economic Community (later the EU) in 1972 took a central European path. The other five EFTA 
countries followed in 1994, firstly through the EEA, and then through Finland and Sweden in 1995 
becoming members of the EU. The company laws of these countries were therefore adapted to EU 
company law. Each did, however, have a slightly different approach.12 Even so, there is still a high level 
 
10 See R. Strand and R.E. Freeman, ‘Scandinavian Cooperative Advantage: The Theory and Practice of Stakeholder 
Engagement in Scandinavia’ (2015) 127 Journal of Business Ethics, 65. 
11 See B. Sjåfjell and C.M. Bruner, ‘Corporations and sustainability’, Ch. 1 in this volume.  
12 F. Westman, ‘Nordic Company Law Regulation and Why Harmonisation Through Competition Is Necessary’ 
(2014) 15 European Business Organization Law Review, 357, 357-375. 
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of conformity between them,13based on ‘(i) close relationships and similarities between the Nordic 
countries; (ii) company laws of other Nordic countries as inspiration for legislators; (iii) cooperation 
between Nordic countries; and (iv) the EU company law harmonisation programme’.14 
Some general conclusions can be drawn based on this relative conformity. Firstly, Nordic Companies 
Acts are manifestations of what David Millon denotes ‘traditional’ shareholder primacy.15 The Acts 
emphasise the board’s and the senior management’s broad law-based discretion and  acknowledge 
the special place of boards within the governance structure in relation to other stakeholders.16 The 
default ‘purpose’ of the company is to generate profits for shareholders. This, however, is broadly 
interpreted as being synonymous with the long-term value of the firm itself, shareholders’ rights being 
derivative and secondary.17 Shareholders do possess the ultimate decision-making power in a company 
through the general meeting, where they participate in the supervision and control of the company.  
The general meeting generally elects and dismisses board members, with the main exception being 
the employees’ right to elect board members.18 The annual general meeting approves the company’s 
annual accounts, including any distribution of profits. The general meeting is not under ordinary 
circumstances, permitted to distribute more than that proposed by the board, which emphasises the 
board’s duty of care to the company. Board member remuneration must be approved by the general 
meeting, which also appoints the company’s statutory auditors. Mergers and divisions, amendments 
to the company’s articles, and changes to the company’s share capital must be decided by the general 
meeting.19 Shareholder rights are exceptionally strong in Norway, even by Nordic standards, the law 
emphasizing the general meeting’s role as the highest organ of the corporate hierarchy.20 In Nordic 
 
13 J.L. Hansen, Nordic Company Law – The Regulation of Public Companies in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2003), pp. 9-10. 
14 Westman, ‘Nordic Company Law’, 375.  
15 D. Millon, ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’ (2013) 10 University of St. Thomas Law Journal, 1013-4. 
16 B. Sjåfjell, A. Johnston, L. Anker-Sørensen and D. Millon, ‘Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrier to Sustainable 
Companies’ in B. Sjåfjell and B.J. Richardson (eds.) Company Law and Sustainability: Legal Barriers and 
Opportunities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 79, 84. 
17 Sjåfjell et al., ‘Shareholder primacy’, p. 92. 
18 In companies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden with at least 35 (Denmark), 30 (Norway) and 25 (Sweden) 
employees, the employees have the right to elect members to the board. There is no such an absolute right in 
Finland; in Finnish companies with more than 150 employees they have the right to participate in management 
decisions. The mechanism for this can be agreed upon between the company and the employee representatives. 
If there is no agreement, it is up to the company to decide the level at which employees are represented, either 
in a single-tier board, in a supervisory board in a two-tier company or at operating (‘factory’) level. See for 
example www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries. There might also be provisions 
on extraordinary appointment rights in articles of association. 
19 See Finnish Securities Market Association, Danish Corporate Governance Committee, Icelandic Committee on 
Corporate Governance, Norwegian Corporate Governance Board and Swedish Corporate Governance Board, 
Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries (April 2009), p. 6, 
www.cgfinland.fi/images/stories/pdf/nordic_cg_booklet_final_web_version.pdf.  
20 B. Sjåfjell, ‘Sustainable Companies: Possibilities and Barriers in Norwegian Company Law’ (2013) 11 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, 1, 28, 30. 
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countries, only shareholders can bring derivative lawsuits against boards and general managers on 
behalf of the corporation, to redress harm done to the corporation.  
Nordic traditional shareholder primacy, as set out in the corporate governance codes, resonates also 
with Bainbridge’s ‘director primacy’ theory of corporate law. According to this theory, the board’s job 
is to pursue shareholder wealth, the board possessing the broad discretion to select the means to that 
end. The board is also, in general, immune to direct shareholder control of management.21 The 
shareholder governance powers in the Nordic countries are however, according to Bainbridge, beyond 
those provided by US corporate law. This is illustrated by the general meeting’s right to appoint board 
members.22 Nordic law allows, as a counterbalance, the dominant shareholders to be held solely or 
jointly liable with the board for negligent behaviour. A ‘general clause’ furthermore enables the courts 
to strike down any decision made by the general meeting that unfairly advantages one shareholder at 
the expense of the company or other shareholders.23 The law has, furthermore, traditionally protected 
the economic interest of the enterprise through its capital maintenance rules.24 
Nordic corporate law therefore creates a platform for ‘shareholder activism’, a platform that is 
predominantly for the protection of long-term investments, even where the investments’ wider 
societal purpose is taken into consideration.25 Nordic capital markets are, on the other hand, highly 
integrated both internally and externally. A number of cross-border mergers have taken place that 
have created large international ‘pan-Nordic’ companies, some of these companies being listed on 
more than one Nordic stock exchange. This is designed to attract non-Nordic international investors 
and to satisfy institutional shareholders’ and their investment supply chains’ demands for returns. The 
negative effect of these conflicting aims has been that it has led to market-driven ‘radical’ shareholder 
primacy inspired by Anglo-Saxon corporate governance codes.26 These codes make, from the point of 
view of the law, doubtful financial economics based claims about the nature of the privileged position 
of shareholders within corporations, and legally inaccurate claims of an agency relationship between 
 
21 S.M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’ (2003) 97 Northwestern 
University Law Review, 547; Millon, ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’, 1017.  
22 J.L. Hansen, ‘A Scandinavian Approach to Corporate Governance’ (2007) 50 Scandinavian Studies in Law, 125, 
131-132, 133.  
23 Hansen, ’A Scandinavian Approach’, 133. 
24 Sjåfjell, ’Sustainable Companies’, 19 (on Norway); Westman, ‘Nordic Company Law’, 360 (on Sweden). 
25 Sjåfjell, ‘Sustainable Companies’, 5, 19. 
26 Millon, ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’. 
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the board and senior management and the shareholders as ‘owners’ of the company,27 a claim 
unknown to Nordic law.28 
There is, however, a societal agenda within the Western Scandinavian corporate governance codes,29 
as we see in the Norwegian code. In the 2018 Norwegian code it has attempted to take a step further 
compared to the 2014 code; moving from speaking about ‘ethical guidelines’ to seeking to integrate 
societal values better into the role of the board, 30 with emphasis on the definition of ‘objectives, 
strategies and risk profiles’.31 The code reflects the shareholder emphasis of the corporate governance 
movement, stating that the board is to do this ‘support value creation for shareholders’. Yet it goes on 
to add that the company should have ‘guidelines for how it integrates considerations related to its 
stakeholders into its value creation’.32 The recommendation on internal control and risk management 
now specifies that they are to encompass the integration of ‘considerations related to stakeholders 
into its creation of value’.33 This is also reflected in the Swedish code, which sees the board’s 
responsibility as defining appropriate guidelines to govern the company’s conduct in society, and 
ensuring its long-term value creation capability. 34 
The main obstacle facing sustainability is not law, but the social norm of ‘radical’ shareholder primacy, 
which is propagated in the Nordic countries by financial markets and professionals.35 This view is 
reflected in Eastern Scandinavian corporate governance codes in particular,36 and has also affected the 
interpretation of Western Scandinavian codes.37 Good governance means, according to the Swedish 
code for example, ensuring that companies are run sustainably, responsibly, and as efficiently as 
 
27 The Iceland Chamber of Commerce, SA Business Iceland and Nasdaq Iceland, The Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance (5th edn., Icelandic CGC: June 2015), p. 19; Securities Markets Association, Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code 2015 (Finnish CGC), 12, 15, 17; Swedish Corporate Governance Board, The Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code (Swedish CGC), p. 7, 20; Committee on Corporate Governance, Recommendations on 
Corporate Governance (November 2017, Danish CGC), 9; Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NCGB), The 
Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (17 October 2018, Norwegian CGC), 51. 
28 More generally, see Millon, ‘Radical Shareholder Primacy’, 1024. 
29 Sjåfjell, ’Sustainable Companies’, 23. 
30 Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (NCGB), The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
(17 October 2014, NCGB 2018), p. 10. 
31 Ibid, Section 2. 
32 Ibid, explanatory notes to Section 2, stating that the Code goes further than the Accounting Act’s 
implementation of the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive. 
33 Ibid, Section 10. 
34 Swedish CGC, p. 17. 
35 See for example F. Truyen, Aksjonærenes myndighetsmisbruk [Shareholder abuse of authority] (Oslo: Cappelen 
akademisk forlag, 2005); R. Skog, ‘The Importance of Profit in Company Law – a Comment from a Swedish 
Perspective’ (2015) 12 European Company and Financial Law Review, 563. Critically, see Sjåfjell, ’Sustainable 
Companies’; Sjåfjell et al, ‘Shareholder primacy’, 82-86. 
36 Finnish CGC; Swedish CGC. 
37 Sjåfjell, ’Shareholder primacy’, 106-7. 
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possible on behalf of the shareholders.38 The code does not, however, cover ‘stakeholder’ issues, as 
this ‘is felt to be beyond the framework of an owner-orientated view of corporate governance’.39 
Sustainability is not seen to be the responsibility of companies, but to be the responsibility of the 
‘owners’,40 as reflected in section 3 below. There is no direct nor indirect reference to ‘stakeholders’, 
‘CSR’, or sustainability in the Finnish code, which is solely targeted at shareholders.41 It furthermore 
uses, when non-legal ‘ownership language’ typical for radical shareholder primacy.42 
3. Private shareholdings and financial intermediaries 
3.1. Nordic listed corporations: concentration of corporate control 
Shareholdings concentration is the most notable peculiarity of the Nordic governance model of listed 
corporations. Close to two thirds of all listed companies in the region have at least one shareholder 
controlling more than 20 per cent of total votes, and about one fifth of companies are under the 
absolute control of a single shareholder.43 The Nordic countries, despite being partially coordinated 
and partially state-led,44 are advanced, well-developed market economies and active participants in 
international capital markets. The countries, for their sizes, host a remarkable number of world-leading 
companies, both private and state controlled, larger foreign minority shareholders also being attracted 
in many cases. Foreign direct investments are mostly European, the top five origins being the UK, 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Russia.45 Foreign investor shareholdings in Iisted companies 
has increased significantly in recent decades and is now more than 40 per cent of the aggregate stock 
market value in the region, this varying from 35 per cent for Finland to 51 per cent for Denmark.46 The 
majority of listed companies are, from an international perspective, ‘small cap companies’ with 
 
38 Swedish CGC p. 2. 
39 Swedish CGC, p. 4. 
40 Swedish CGC, p. 7. 
41 Finnish CGC, p. 9. 
42 Finnish CGC, p. 12. 
43 Lekvall (ed.), The Nordic Corporate Governance Model, p. 23. 
44 Market economies can be divided into coordinated, liberal and state-led economies. Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden (and Austria, Germany and Japan) are typical coordinated market economies with strategic 
interactions with firms, with non-market institutions such as business associations and with trade unions that 
play a dominant role in coordinating the economy. In state-led market economies, including France and South 
Korea and partially Norway, Finland and Sweden, the state plays a dominant role in markets. See P.A. Hall and D. 
Soskice, ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’ in P.A. Hall and D. Soskice (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism: The 
Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 1; see also N. 
Kang and J. Moon, ‘Institutional complementarity between corporate governance and Corporate Social 
Responsibility: a comparative institutional analysis of three capitalisms’ (2012) 10 Socio-Economic Review, 85. 
45 EY, ‘Onward and upward: EY Attractiveness Program’, Nordics, August 2018, p. 9. 
46 Lekvall (ed.) The Nordic Corporate Governance Model, pp. 47, 112, 117, 170-171, 202, 250. 
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predominantly domestic shareholders.47 International institutional investors represent a small but 
growing proportion of shareholders. Retail shareholding is, however, Iow except for Sweden.48 
Norwegian domestic investors have long been interested in investor activism.49 Investor engagement 
in Sweden, due to shareholder friendly corporate governance, has led lately to both domestic activism, 
primarily the Swedish activist Christell Gardell and his hedge fund Cevian, and foreign activism towards 
management. This activism can be ‘softer’ and more long term oriented than in, for example, the 
United States, due to this being based on dialogue with boards rather than confrontation.50 
Long-termism (rather than short-term gains) has been a trademark of the ‘Nordic model’. The potential 
drivers of sustainability include long-term activist shareholders such as Cevian, the strong position of 
Nordic states as shareholders and the Nordic corporate peculiarity of direct ‘super-long-term’ 
shareholdings held by influential families and civil law foundations.51 Examples of influential families 
include the Herlin family, which controls Kone, the Bonnier family which controls the Bonnier Group, 
and the Wallenberg family which, through their foundation and investments, holds substantial stakes 
in a number of leading Swedish and Finnish listed companies including AstraZeneca, Electrolux, 
Ericsson, Saab, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, and Wärtsilä. These companies are corner stones of 
the ‘Swedish model’, which is based on a strong belief in social engineering, a corporatist state, 
economic growth, and political stability.52 
The development of leading Swedish international companies has been closely related to a specific 
type of governance system, one distinguished by corporate groups and dynastic families. Family 
shareholdings are notably not limited to small or medium sized enterprises or traditionally strong 
family industries such as shipping and trade. Dynastic families have been and continue to be vital within 
large industries such as engineering, forestry and pharmaceutics.53 The leading industrial families have, 
 
47 Corporate Governance in the Nordic Countries.  
48 Sjåfjell, ‘Sustainable Companies’, p. 4. 
49 B. Scholtens and R. Sievänen, ‘Drivers of Socially Responsible Investing: A Case Study of Four Nordic Countries’ 
(2013) 115 Journal of Business Ethics, 605. 
50 ‘A Swedish activist speaks softly and carries a big stick: Cevian is Europe’s largest activist fund’, The Economist, 
15 June 2017, www.economist.com/business/2017/06/15/a-swedish-activist-speaks-softly-and-carries-a-big-
stick; E. Guzun, ’U.S. Activist Funds Increasingly Setting Sights on European Companies’, HedgeNordic 22 
September 2017, www.hedgenordic.com/2017/09/u-s-activist-funds-increasingly-setting-sights-on-european-
companies/; R. Milne, ‘Christer Gardell, Cevian Capital founder, on clearing out boards: Europe’s biggest activist 
investor shakes up management teams to unlock hidden value’, Financial Times, 10 September  2017, 
ft.com/content/1fdd0a6c-92ed-11e7-a9e6-11d2f0ebb7f0.  
51 Lekvall (ed.), The Nordic Corporate Governance Model, p. 57. 
52 M. Larsson, H. Lindgren and D. Nyberg, ‘Entrepreneurship and ownership: the long-term viability of the 
Swedish Bonnier and Wallenberg family business groups’ in S. Fellman, M.J. Iversen, H. Sjögren and L. Thue (eds.), 
Creating Nordic Capitalism: The Development of a Competitive Periphery (Basingstone: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), p. 75. 
53 Larsson, Lindgren and Nyberg, ‘Entrepreneurship’, p. 75. 
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within the Swedish model, been referred to as the backbone of Swedish corporate shareholders and 
often have long traditions of investing in stocks and are claimed to control 70 percent of the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange.54 
The second identifying phenomenon is private foundations as institutional investors.55 In Denmark for 
example, more than 60 per cent of total stock market capitalization is held by foundations such as 
Carlsberg, Novo Nordisk, Lundbeckfonden and A.P. Møller. In Sweden, two leading business groups 
(Industrivärden and Wallenberg) are based on foundations. IKEA is also controlled by the more recently 
established Kamprad family foundation. The prevalence of this structure is most directly explained by 
high wealth taxes making foundations an attractive way for founding families to maintain control. The 
charitable nature of foundation share ownership may, however and in turn, have also fostered social 
legitimacy for large companies, an aspect that is essential to corporate sustainability.56 
3.2. Banks and sustainability 
Banks and institutional investors are according to empirical research a major motor of ESG 
performance. Regulatory and legal constraints furthermore mean that banks in the Nordics are not 
permitted to hold long-term equity stakes in non-financial firms. There are r in the Nordic countries, 
two counterforces to the positive impact of bank influence upon company sustainability. Firstly, 
Finland has the peculiarity of public-private-hybrid pension insurance companies as institutional 
investors, that play a larger role. They operate more in line with the traditionally Anglo-American 
shareholder primacy, more strongly characterized by ‘institutional investor activism’ than their 
counterparts in other Nordic countries. They are guided by short-termism rather than long-termism. 
The ‘Nordic active investor model’ has been weakened in Finland by the state simultaneously and 
systematically reducing its direct and indirect shareholdings in listed companies.57 
Secondly, the banks’ impact upon promoting ESG principles has been counter-productive due to a 
series of banking crises in the Nordic countries. All the Nordic countries have, after their banking 
sectors were liberalized, experienced a rapid growth in credit, this resulting in banking crises of varying 
degrees of severity.58 The lessons learned during these periods of crisis served Norwegian, Finnish, 
 
54 Lie, ‘Context’, 924. 
55 See H. Hansmann and S. Thomsen, ‘The Governance of Foundation-Owned Firms’ (July 14, 2017), 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=3112766. 
56 Thomsen, ‘The Nordic Corporate Governance Model’, 198. 
57 Lekvall (ed.), The Nordic Corporate Governance Model, p. 171. 
58 T.G. Moe, J.A. Solheim and B. Vale (eds.), The Norwegian Banking Crisis, (Oslo: Norges Bank, Occasional Papers 
No. 33, 2004); K. Abildgren and J. Thomsen, A Tale of Two Danish Banking Crises, Monetary Review 1st Quarter 
(Danmarks Nationalbanken, 2011); S. Honkapohja, ‘Financial Crises: Lessons from the Nordic Experience’ (2014) 
13 Journal of Financial Stability, 193; G. Johnsen, Bringing Down the Banking Sector: Lessons from Iceland (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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Faroese and Swedish bankers and policy makers well. All these countries therefore came relatively 
unscathed out of the global financial crisis. The European Economic Area Agreement entered into force 
in 1994 soon after the first Nordic crisis, this requiring the mandatory implementation of EU legislation 
on financial oversight. 
Repeated banking crises in the Nordics feed into the discussion on the merits of bank-based versus 
market-based financial systems. The Nordics, with the exception of Denmark, are generally identified 
as being bank-based systems.59 Post-crisis literature, however, favours market-based systems, as the 
financial crisis60 and the housing crisis61 was more severe in bank-based financial systems than in 
market-based ones.62 Banks, to a much greater extent than markets, overextend credit during financial 
upturns and ration it during financial downturns.63 The question of why this is the case remains. Official 
investigations looking into the causes of banking crises in different jurisdictions point to incentives 
embedded in bankers’ pay and the contribution this made to excessive credit growth in the period 
running up to the crisis.64 Regulators in Europe have responded to these findings by capping the 
incentive pay of bankers to 50 per cent of total pay.65 
The Icelandic public gained a rare inside look into bankers’ allocation of credit, through the exceptional 
data privileges provided by a Parliamentary Special Investigation Commission into the causes of the 
total banking collapse in Iceland in 2008.66 Iceland, operating under the European Economic Area 
legislation and the Basel Accord, experienced exceptional credit growth. Credit to the private sector 
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grew from 45 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1996 to 312 per cent in 2006.67 A complex 
cross-holding structure of firms that were initiated by bankers who needed to allocate credit during 
the credit boom, was uncovered. This included large corporate entities tied together through share-
ownership of banks and their controlling shareholders, mainly funded with borrowed money from the 
banks and often with insignificant amount of shareholders equity.68 Incentive pay helped create the 
excessive credit risk exposure. The banks themselves were, however, engaged in misreporting of their 
own equity and the general managers and key employees of all three banks, Glitnir, Landsbanki and 
Kaupthing were found guilty of market manipulation of banks’ stock prices.69 Equity ratios were 
misreported due to staff being permitted to inappropriately hedge stock options, and due to banks 
funding acquisitions of their own shares for related parties and favoured customers without deducting 
those loans from the banks’ equity bases. Research carried out, for example, by Talley and Johnsen70 
and Peng and Roell71 indicates banks’ incentive systems fuelled risk taking and prompted the 
misreporting of financial results at the end of the boom period, when targets were unlikely to be met.72 
The incentive pay of bankers emphasised the bottom line of banking operations. This is likely to 
encourage credit bubbles through project finance, which ultimately leads to the instability of the 
banking system itself. ESG considerations are therefore left to equity holders such as pension funds, 
industrial foundations, and other long-term shareholders, as banks have only recently turned their 
focus towards green bond issues and other such instruments promoting responsible environmental 
policy. 
Icelandic policy-makers took decisive steps, post-crisis, to reign in the destabilizing incentives of 
bankers’ pay, by capping this to 25 per cent of total pay. The pan-European ceiling was 50 per cent.73 
Legal reforms in Iceland were geared to allowing the financial surveillance authorities to better 
intervene in banking operations through adding more stringent requirements to the equity funding of 
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systemically important institutions.74 The Icelandic legislature furthermore, in an attempt to alter the 
‘DNA’ of financial institutions, indirectly redefined the purpose of financial institutions by specifically 
stipulating that the purpose of the law on financial undertakings (that regulates the banking sector), is 
to ensure that banks’ operations are conducted in a healthy and sustainable way, whilst taking the 
interests of customers, shareholders, and the rest of society into account.75 
It is too early to tell whether this attempt imbues the spirit of the law into its interpretation on financial 
undertakings or whether it can counter the otherwise Romanesque tradition in Iceland, in which the 
letter of the law rather than the spirit prevails in the interpretation of the law. The legislature’s aim of 
the amendment was, however, clear. It was to promote the sustainability of the banking sector and 
encourage responsible credit allocation that takes into consideration environmental factors, other 
stakeholders, customers, shareholders and society at large.76 Attributing the good standing of the 
Icelandic banks post-crisis to this change in the law is, however, problematic. Financial oversight has 
also been strengthened significantly. The Icelandic State has taken over the shareholdings of two of 
the three largest banks in the country, and regulatory equity requirements have increased to 20 per 
cent capital adequacy ratios, from 8 per cent in 2008. Management has also introduced more 
sustainable business models. These are in line with the shareholder policy of the Icelandic Financial 
State Holding Company, and in line with a focus on local business. 
Nordic Financial Surveillance Authorities have introduced more stringent bank management 
requirements that are in line with EU regulations such as the Capital Requirement Directive IV. The 
requirements include stricter eligibility and integrity requirements (‘fit & proper’). These make it easier 
for the authorities to step in to remove the executive management and boards of irresponsibly 
operated financial institutions.77 A self-assessment process has, furthermore, been established for 
determining the competency of financial institution boards. Variable pay of management and 
employees whose activities have a significant impact on the undertaking’s risk profile, has also been 
capped at 50 per cent of total compensation, including pensions.78 
The rapid expansion in credit to the private sector, which exceeded 300 per cent of GDP in the run up 
to the Icelandic banking collapse, clearly shows how great the country’s sovereign exposure to 
universal banking became. Bank credit to the private sector in other Nordic countries relative to GDP 
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was, in 2006, between 73 and 170 per cent. In 2016, however, credit in Iceland had fallen significantly 
to 86 per cent of GDP. It has, however, risen in Sweden and Norway to 120 and 144 percent 
respectively. Denmark still had the most indebted private sector of the Nordics at 170 per cent of GDP. 
Finland maintained its private debt stock at a modest 97 per cent of GDP in the same period.79 
4. The role of the State as shareholder 
Nordic economies, with the exception of Denmark, are typical examples of ‘mixed ownership’.80 Public 
entities such as states and municipalities play important roles as shareholders in both private and listed 
companies. Governments and public pension funds have, for some time, been seen as being major 
socially responsible investors in Europe.81 
Public pension funds have, in particular, become important institutional shareholders. The largest 
pension fund in Norway, the Norwegian municipalities’ pension fund (Kommunal Landspensjonskasse), 
which to start with followed the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global’s (GPFG) ethical 
guidelines for an exclusion policy,82 has turned towards active investments in sustainable 
infrastructure.83 The Danish public pension funds and the Finnish pension insurance companies are 
quasi-public institutional investors, which have been set up as part of industrial sector agreements on 
pensions and are regulated by acts of parliament.84 Finnish pension insurance companies have become 
active investors, increasing their shareholding in Finnish listed companies since 2000.85 Responsible 
investment is, furthermore, emphasized at a regulatory level, especially in Denmark and Sweden. The 
National Swedish Pension Funds (Ap-fonderna) are, for example, required to consider ethical and 
environmental aspects. This is not, however, permitted to impair long-term returns.86 On the other 
hand, the private impact of investors in Sweden is greater than that of public investors.87 
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Secondly, the governments of Denmark and Norway have had a specific ‘CSR’ agenda. This was 
reflected, for example, in the ‘sustainability reporting’ regulation.88 This is now history in Norway, 
abolishing from 2018 sustainability reporting requirements for all but the very largest firms.89 The 
Nordic states, especially Norway and Sweden, are seen to be the ‘current driving force in European 
SOEs … guided by principles of profitability and exemplary responsibility’, described as the ‘Nordic SOE 
model’.90 The Finnish State has been a significant shareholder in Finnish non-listed and listed 
companies since World War II and even prior to this. It has, however, systematically reduced and 
decentralised its direct and indirect shareholdings in Finnish listed companies from 2007.91 Nordic 
indirect state shareholdings, especially those held by the Norwegian GPFG, are also of great interest 
due to it investing globally, as has been analysed elsewhere.92 
Norway, as a state-controlled market economy,93 is in a class of its own. It relies heavily on directly 
controlled SOEs, notably in the energy and oil sector. The Norwegian state corporate involvement as 
a shareholder is, in general, significantly more prevalent than in any other OECD country and 
comparable to that of emerging economies.94 The Norwegian transition to a state-led market 
economy, however, began after World War II, when the weakness of local capital markets prevented 
private firms from financing industrial development. The preservation of state share ownership has 
been explained by Lie using three characteristics of the Norwegian national political, social, and 
economic context: a high level of trust in the state as a protector of common interests, a persistent 
lack of robust private investors (unlike Denmark and Sweden), and a strong inclination to avoid a 
powerful foreign influence in the domestic economy.95 
A major change took place in the 1990s, when SOEs were converted to listed companies in which the 
state held majority control.96 Norwegian company law, the equal treatment of shareholders (minority 
protection) and the exceptionally large powers of the general meeting even by Nordic standards,97 give 
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the state’s large shareholdings in listed companies predominant power in the companies it invests in. 
The government has continuously strived to strengthen the corporate governance of SOEs, as defined 
by international models. This has been touted as being ‘of vital importance to the market’s confidence 
in the companies and therefore to companies’ capital costs’.98 The government had formulated, as 
early as 2002, ten principles of corporate governance for SOEs to increase predictability in the exercise 
of state share ownership. Their 2014 amendments were to underscore the role of the boards as well 
as commitment to ‘CSR’. The Government emphasizes that the principles, in essence, correspond with 
the OECD Guidelines on the Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises.99 The State also 
emphasises sustainability and responsibility in the conduct of its businesses.100 
Also the Swedish state is still a significant company shareholder.101 The Swedish government has for 
more than a decade systematically built a sustainability agenda.102 In 2012 the government set a 
number of sustainability goals for SOEs. 103 The Swedish state, however, sees its primary responsibility, 
at a policy level, to be an active and professional shareholder. The Government’s current overall 
objective is that the companies generate long-term value,104 increase their competitiveness, and 
develop value and capital efficiency. 
The East Scandinavian shareholder primacy drive is, in terms of state shareholdings, even more 
dominant in Finland than in Norway and Sweden. The Finnish state relies on Solidium Oy to manage its 
USD 11 billion of assets. Solidium Oy is the holding company for government shares in listed companies 
of national interest.105 The main philosophy of Solidium is to grow and secure shareholder value. Other 
objectives are seen as being secondary. According to Solidium, ‘proper management of corporate 
responsibility is a key requirement for creating successful businesses and long-term financial value’.106 
Sustainability is not expressly recognized by Solidium to any degree. 
There is a striking similarity between the profit-seeking policies of Norwegian and Finnish SOEs. The 
Norwegian government, following the path of other Nordic countries’, recently vowed to reduce state 
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shareholdings in the economy.107 According to the government, the mixed roles of shareholder, public 
procurer and regulator weaken the state’s legitimacy, and also the profitability and effectiveness of its 
undertakings. The current government has formulated a clear policy of state share ownership, the 
primary responsibility of the state for business and industry being ‘to facilitate high levels of value 
creation in the economy through stable, well-designed framework conditions, rather than managing 
or owning business activities on its own account, in areas where there are political objectives’.108 
The Nordic states’ struggle with their SOEs show that there is no automatic correlation between state 
shareholdings and sustainability. SOEs are vulnerable to changes in political trends, as shown in 
particular by Finland and Norway. Profit maximisation is set as a priority goal for public investments, 
although the Swedish state still emphasises sustainability goals. There is, furthermore, no intrinsic 
sustainability in this investment model. Investments are sustainable only if the government and its 
authorities are committed to sustainability. The Icelandic public does not have much confidence or 
trust in the post-crisis banking sector (only 16% considers it trustworthy), but does consider (61% of 
the public) the Icelandic state to be a trustworthy and responsible controlling shareholder in two of 
the three largest re-established banks.109 
5. Conclusion: the way forward 
Nordic black letter corporate law is neutral to corporate purpose and corporate interest. Business-
driven legal literature and corporate governance codes are, however, not. The Nordic codes have been 
prepared by law firms, stock exchanges, the companies themselves, and institutional investors such as 
pension funds, without stakeholder participation and reference to real sustainability.  
The strength of the ‘Nordic model’ is, however, not found in law or in codes. This is particularly 
prevalent in East Scandinavia, where radical shareholder primacy dominates, which is in contrast to a 
typical Nordic form of ‘active ownership’110 by non-institutional direct shareholders such as families 
and foundations, public pension funds and companies. Yet, this insufficient and a broader participation 
of active investors is required for sustainability to be achieved. Profit maximisation has, from around 
2007, dominated Finnish and Norwegian state share ownership, preventing a bold move to sustainable 
investments and shareholder activism in the Nordic countries, despite these being more long-term 
oriented than the Anglo-American world. The shareholder-friendly Nordic company law, strengthens 
the role of active shareholders, but does not set a direction for their activism. 
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The answer might be found in the activity of the board. ‘Soft’ shareholder activism, based on a dialogue 
between investors and the board, gives room for the boards to convince investors of the advantages 
of being long-term sustainable. Nordic company law provides ample opportunities for boards to 
promote sustainability independently of, but in a constructive dialogue with, the shareholders. The 
most important barrier is not in the law but it is shareholder primacy as a social norm,111 supported by 
corporate governance codes particularly in Sweden and Finland, blurring what the board’s competence 
is and what its responsibilities to the company entity really are.112 
A special concern should be expressed with regards to banks. The recurring banking crises in the Nordic 
countries show that bankers’ motives for profit maximisation should be particularly constrained, so 
that it is ensured that banks act as a sustainable factor in the markets. This is, however, a global 
phenomenon. The tools for banks’ contribution to strong sustainability are found at the operational 
and institutional level and are based on robust stress-testing, capital requirements and central bank 
monetary policies.113 
The crucial issue is how radical shareholder primacy can be combated in a way that gives companies 
that push to pursue sustainable value a competitive advantage. One possible way forward could be 
through a corporate law reform.114 The Nordic countries could, based on the flexibility of their 
corporate law, the commitment of the Nordic countries’ important private long-term investors and the 
sustainability concerns of public market actors, be a good place to start this process. If the Nordic 
region was committed to jointly instigating a sustainable company law reform, then one would hope 
the EU would follow suit, as it has done with Norway’s lead on setting gender equality as a guideline 
for corporate boards.115 
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